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 Abstract 
We conduct a controlled lab-field experiment to directly test the short-run spillover effects of one-off financial 
incentives in health. We consider how incentives affect effort in a physical activity task – and then how they 
spillover to subsequent eating behaviour. Compared to a control group, we find that low incentives increase 
effort and have little effect on eating behaviour. High incentives also induce more effort but lead to significantly 
more excess calories consumed. The key behavioural driver appears to be the level of satisfaction associated 
with the physical activity task, which ‘licensed’ highly paid subjects to indulge in more energy-dense food. 
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I. Introduction 
One of the main areas of interest to economists is the analysis of how 
people react to different types of incentives (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999; Laffont 
and Martimort, 2002; Gneezy and List, 2013). By the “basic law of behaviour” 
(Gneezy et al., 2011), higher incentives lead to greater effort and performance. 
There is now good evidence that financial incentives can influence a range of 
behaviours, such as weight loss (Volpp et al. 2008; John et al. 2011, 2012; 
Kullgren et al. 2013); smoking cessation (Volpp et al. 2009); gym attendance 
(Charness and Gneezy, 2009); and children immunization (Banerjee et al., 2010). 
Financial and non-financial incentives are being considered as a way to bring 
about changes in a number of risky health behaviours, including heavy drinking, 
unsafe sex, unhealthy eating, and lack of physical exercise (Loewenstein et al., 
2007, 2012; Marteau et al., 2009; Volpp et al. 2011).  
There is also evidence, however, that highlights the ‘hidden costs’ of 
incentives (Fehr and List, 2004), including crowding out of intrinsic motivation 
(Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Deci et al. 1999); changing social norms or 
individual beliefs about social norms (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000a,b; Heyman 
and Ariely, 2004); interacting with reciprocity, reputation, and social comparison 
concerns (Fehr and Gachter, 1997; Rigdon, 2009; Ariely et al. 2009a; Dur et al. 
2010; Gachter and Thoni, 2010; Greiner et al. 2011), and ‘choking’ due to the 
anxiety aroused by relating payment to performance (Ariely et al. 2009b). In such 
cases, incentives may ‘backfire’, in that they result in the opposite effects to the 
ones originally envisaged (Fehr and Falk, 2002; Benabou and Tirole, 2003, 2006; 
Kamenica, 2012). Policy makers obviously need to be alert to such unintended 
consequences (Dolan et al. 2012; Dolan and Galizzi, 2014).  
The economics literature, however, has been largely silent on the spillover 
effects that incentives may have on behaviours other than the ones directly 
targeted. A recent comprehensive review of the experimental evidence in the 
behavioural sciences suggests that behavioural spillovers are, in fact, pervasive 
(Dolan and Galizzi, 2013). Consider two subsequent behaviours. On some 
occasions the second behaviour reinforces the first (‘promoting’ spillovers). As an 
example, subjects who wrote down as many arguments they could think of why 
smoking was bad for their health, then, once outside the lab, waited significantly 
longer before they lightened up a cigarette (Müller et al., 2009). Households who 
responded more frequently to health surveys, one year later had higher levels of 
chlorine in their stored drinking water (Zwane et al. 2011). 
In many health contexts, however, the general message seems to be that 
two subsequent behaviours typically push into opposite directions (‘permitting‘ 
spillovers). For instance, subjects who took a placebo pill that they believed was a 
multivitamin supplement, later on indulged in less healthy choices and walked 
less on their way to return a pedometer than participants told the pill was a 
placebo (Chiou et al., 2011a,b). Wisdom et al. (2010) made the healthy 
sandwiches options in Subways restaurants more salient by reporting them in the 
first page of the menus, and found that “choosing from the healthy menu may 
have led to a sense of deservingness upon seeing the unhealthy sandwiches that 
were passed up, leading people to reward themselves with higher-calorie side 
dishes and drinks” (p. 171). In Epstein et al. (2010), subjects tended not only to 
buy more healthy, subsidized, foods, but also to change their purchases of other 
foods at sale in a way to increase their overall caloric intakes. Similarly, 
participants who imagined a scenario where they were walking 30 minutes (Werle 
et al. 2010), or were exposed to exercise commercials (Van Kleef et al. 2011) ate 
more calories in snacks than control subjects exposed to neutral scenarios. 
A key question is whether monetary incentives, which are usually 
powerful in changing target behaviour, are also affected by spillovers. None of the 
above studies documenting spillovers, in fact, have explicitly looked at 
conditional financial incentives. In this paper, we consider the short-term spillover 
effects of monetary incentives in health, and shed new light on three main 
questions: i) whether spillover effects exist; ii) whether they depend on the size 
and the nature of the incentives; and iii) which behavioural mechanisms are most 
likely to explain the spillover effects.  
In our lab-field experiment, subjects were randomly assigned to either a 
control or one of three treatment groups, and asked to make a real-effort physical 
task, consisting in stepping as many times they could for two minutes. In the 
control group, no conditional financial incentive was paid and subjects 
participated into a lottery after the task. In the high-incentive group subjects were 
paid 10p for each completed step, whilst in the low-incentive group they were 
paid 2p for each step. Finally, in the encouragement group, subjects were 
‘nudged’ to work hard without any financial incentive. After the lab task all 
participants were offered an ostensibly unrelated free buffet lunch in a room next 
to the lab. Unbeknownst to subjects, the number and type of foods and drinks 
consumed in the lunch by each participant was recorded.  
We found that, while subjects in the incentivised arms performed a 
significantly higher number of steps than in the control group (about 102 and 105 
steps, compared to 89), subjects in the high incentive group also exhibited 
significant forms of spillovers: compared to the control group, they were more 
likely to have lunch following the task, and, there, they consumed more energy-
dense items, in particular side dishes - such as crisps and sweets - and sweetened 
drinks. As a result, the difference between calories consumed and burned in the 
high incentive group is significantly higher than the analogous difference in the 
control (415.9 excess calories compared to 219.7). Although smaller in size, this 
pattern is similar for the subjects encouraged to work hard in absence of financial 
incentives, whereas spillovers did not occur in presence of low financial 
incentives. The key behavioural driver was the level of satisfaction with the 
stepping performance: although, in fact, they exercised as hard as their peers in 
the low incentives group, subjects paid high monetary incentives (and, to a lesser 
extent, subjects ‘nudged’ to exercise) felt higher levels of satisfaction with the just 
accomplished task (8.42, and 7.49, compared to 6.39, on a 0-10 scale). Consistent 
with ‘permitting’ spillovers and ‘licensing’ effects, the higher satisfaction with the 
task fed into feeling that subjects ‘deserved a treat’ and gave them ‘license’ to 
indulge more in tastier, but also more energy-dense, foods and drinks.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the 
methods and the experiment. Section 3 reports the main results. Section 4 
discusses the results and concludes.  
II. Methods
The experiment was designed to test for short-term spillover effects in 
health behaviours that are relevant for both research and policy purposes. We 
therefore looked at one-off incentives for physical exercise – ‘calories out’ – and 
explored their possible spillovers for eating behaviour – ‘calories in’. Physical 
exercise is of increasing interest among behavioural and health economists (Della 
Vigna and Malmendier, 2006; Acland and Levy, 2013; Cawley et al. 2013) and 
incentives for physical exercise have already been proved to be effective 
(Charness and Gneezy, 2009). We opted for stepping for two minutes because it is 
a familiar, effortful but not overly exhausting task, and because it results in only 
around 15 calories being burned (Keytel et al., 2005). As in Werle et al. (2010), 
Wisdom et al. (2010), and Van Kleef et al. (2011) we considered a task related to 
healthy eating as the non-targeted health behaviour where spillovers might occur. 
The experimental protocol was approved by the LSE Research Ethics 
Committee and by the Board of Directors of the Centre for the Study of Incentives 
in Health (CSIH), which funded the experiment. All experimental sessions were 
run at the LSE Behavioural Research Lab (BRL) between June and September 
2012. Subjects were recruited from the volunteers in the BRL mailing list (about 
5,000 subjects, mostly current and former students of the University of London). 
There was no other eligibility or exclusion criterion to select participants. In the 
email invitation, subjects were not informed about the exact nature of the 
experiment that would be conducted, and were only told that: the experiment 
would last about an hour; they would receive £10 for their participation; they 
would have the chance to get an extra payment related to their tasks. Subjects 
could sign up to any of five one-hour sessions starting every hour between 11 am 
and 3 pm at every working day in the week.  
A total of 156 subjects participated into 24 experimental sessions. At their 
arrival into the BRL, subjects were identified anonymously using an ID code 
assigned by the online recruitment system (SONA), and asked to read an 
informed consent form, and to sign the latter if they agreed on carry on with the 
experiment.1 Next, by asking them to draw a number for their cubicle in the lab, 
subjects were randomly assigned to either a control group (C) or one of three 
treatment groups (H, L, and E, to be explained below).  Randomization resulted in 
40 subjects assigned to treatment H, 39 each to groups L and E, and 38 to the 
control group C. Treatments were equally spread across the various sessions of 
the day (Table 1): a Pearson chi-squared test cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
the experimental groups and the timeslots were independent (p=0.887). 
1
 All subjects who turned to the BRL lab gave their consent and decided to take part to the experiment. When, before 
the exercise task, they were asked to confirm their consent, all subjects agreed again and regularly concluded the 
experiment. 
The experiment started with all subjects entering the main ‘laboratory’ 
room at BRL, sitting at their assigned desk, and reading a set of written 
instructions.2 In the instructions, subjects were informed that the experiment 
consisted in three subsequent tasks: tasks 1 and 3 were questionnaires, while task 
2 was a very simple physical task. Next subjects took part in task 1, which was 
designed to be a ‘filler’ questionnaire task and asked about basic background 
characteristics. While they were answering the questionnaire at their cubicles in 
the main lab room, the subjects were individually approached and asked if they 
could follow the experimenter to take part in task 2. 
The experimenter accompanied the subject in one of the five small rooms 
that can be accessed from the main lab room. In the room there was a scale, a 
vertical meter, a 6-inches high stepper, and a professional heart-rate meter. The 
experimenter then measured and weighted each subject, and immediately before 
the physical exercise task, also took and recorded the heart rate measure using a 
professional heart rate meter (in beats per minute, bpm). Also before the physical 
exercise task, subjects rated how much ‘full of energy’ they felt, as well as three 
2
 Sample instructions for the experiment can be requested from the authors. 
other happiness dimensions, using 0-10 Likert scales and tests directly taken from 
the wellbeing literature (Dolan et al., 2011). 
In all groups, subjects were then asked to do as many times as they could 
do in two minutes the simple task they were then showed by the experimenter, 
which consisted in stepping up and down on the stepper with both feet. Subjects 
were then asked to confirm that they wished to continue with the experiment and, 
if so, were invited to start.  
The difference between the four groups was that, while, at the end of their 
task, subjects in the control group (C) participated in a lottery to win an amount of 
£20, subjects in treatment groups H and L were given conditional financial 
incentives to exercise. Subjects in the high-incentive (H) group were paid 10p for 
each time they were able to step, whereas subjects in the low-incentive (L) group 
were paid 2p for each performed step. In the last treatment (E), participants did 
not receive any financial incentives and were not exposed to money in any form, 
but rather they were instead ‘nudged’ to exercise hard using verbal 
encouragement. Every 20 seconds the experimenter said encouragement sentences 
like “well done, keep going, you’re doing really well, only another 40 seconds to 
go...”  
Immediately after the physical exercise task, the experimenter measured 
again the heart rate with the professional heart rate meter. Also immediately 
following the task, subjects were asked to rate how satisfied they were with their 
performance using a 0-10 Likert scale. The subjects also rated again (always 
using 0-10 Likert scales) how much ‘full of energy’ they felt, as well as the other 
happiness dimensions. The experimenter then told subjects the number of steps 
they had just completed, asked subjects in C to draw a number for the lottery, and 
announced the amount of the extra-payment for subjects in treatments H and L. 
Before leaving the small room with the stepper, the experiment invited the 
subjects to take a rest for few minutes in another small room nearby, before going 
back to their desk in the main lab room in order to complete the task 1 and task 3 
questionnaires.  
A research assistant then accompanied the subjects to one of two rooms 
that were prepared, ostensibly for the subjects taking a rest. The adjacent rooms 
had some chairs, and a table where some foods and drinks were placed. Subjects 
were told by the research assistant to help themselves with whatever food or drink 
they liked. On the table, different types and varieties of food were available: in 
particular a variety of high-calories sandwiches (bacon, lettuce and tomato; 
chicken and bacon; ham and cheese; tuna and sweet corn), low-fat and -calories 
sandwiches (roast chicken salad; bacon and chicken; tuna and cucumber), and 
vegetarian sandwiches (cheese and tomato; cheese and celery) was available. 
Moreover, crisps, fruits (apples), and different types of sweets (chocolate chips 
muffins, chocolate bars) were also available. Finally, different individual drinks 
(coke, orange juice, and water) were also available. All foods and drinks were 
bought from a leading UK supermarket chain whose policy is to report on each 
item well visible labels with nutritional information: in particular, each item 
reports on the front package a summary label where ‘pies’ with green, amber and 
red ‘signposts’ briefly report how well each item contributes to the recommended 
daily amounts (RDA) of calories, sugars, fats, saturated fats, carbohydrates, and 
salt. On the back of the package, each item also reports a more detailed table with 
full nutritional information according to the guidelines on daily allowances 
(GDA) recommendations. The low-fat sandwiches also report a further label 
saying “Be good to yourself: less than 3% fat”.3  
All foods and items were presented on the table within their own 
packages, in the same position and order to each subject. In fact, soon after that a 
subject had eventually consumed something and decided to leave the room to go 
back to the main lab room, by looking at the table (and the trashing bin) in the 
room, the research assistants recorded the number and type of foods and drinks 
3
 A table with the main nutritional intakes in each food and drink item used in the experiment can be found in the 
Appendix (Table 11). 
the subject had consumed. Then, the assistants also replaced the same food and 
drink items in exactly the same position for the next participant. This allowed us 
to readily calculate how many calories nutritional intakes were consumed in the 
lunch by each participant after the physical task. The overall set-up was designed 
in a way to give the impression that the buffet was merely an act of kindness for 
having participated to the experiment, as commonly used at LSE for taking part in 
surveys and research events. The design is similar to the one in Wisdom et al. 
(2010) and is consistent with the more general idea of finding ways to minimize 
the experimenter demand effect by attempting to ‘obfuscate’ the ultimate 
objective of the experiment (Zizzo, 2010). The envisaged objective to make the 
whole situation sounding very natural to subjects is confirmed by the fact that all 
participants promptly agreed they were keen on taking a rest after their stepping 
task (especially after having seen how much they heart rate increased) and most 
subjects indeed had something to eat, or at least to drink. 
Subjects who had completed the physical task and the following lunch, 
thus went back to the main lab room where they finished the questionnaire for 
task 1. Next, they also answered a questionnaire for task 3, which basically served 
to collect control questions related to the main experimental tasks. Among other 
things, subjects were, in fact, asked about: i) when was the last time they had 
eaten something before coming to the lab; ii) what they ate in that occasion; iii) at 
what time, and what, they had for breakfast that day, and for breakfast, lunch and 
dinner the day before; iv) how much time they spent in moderate and vigorous 
physical activities in the last 24 hours; v) how many calories subjects thought to 
have burnt in the physical exercise task; vi) how many calories they thought to 
have eaten in the lunch buffet; and vii) their usual activities, habits, and life style 
(e.g. portions of different types of foods in the last week; drinking; exercising; 
smoking). After completing task 3, subjects in the H and L groups received 
payment based on their performance in task 2 (10p or 2p for each counted step), 
whereas subjects in C who had then drawn a number corresponding to the number 
of their desk were also paid £20. All subjects then read and signed a debriefing 
form, were thanked, and left the lab. 
The experimental design allows us to directly test our three above 
hypotheses on the spillover effects of incentives in health. If the incentives to 
perform the physical activity also have spillover effects on how subjects behave in 
the subsequent ostensibly unrelated lunch (question i), we should observe choices 
that are significantly different across the H, L, and E treatments and the control 
group, mainly in terms of caloric intakes, but also of the overall nutritional 
balance of the foods and drinks consumed. The head-to-head comparison between 
the three treatments groups allows us to assess whether spillover effects are 
conditional on the size and type of incentives offered (question ii). Statistically 
significant differences between these treatments point against the null hypothesis 
that spillover effects are independent on the size of the financial incentives. 
Similarly, treatments H, L can be compared to treatment E, to test the null 
hypothesis that spillover effects do not depend on whether incentives are in the 
form of financial incentives or non-financial nudges.  
To gain insight into the mechanisms that underpin the spillovers (question 
iii), we can have a closer look at the sign and nature of the short-term spillovers. 
If incentives lead to less calories consumed, then the (financial or non-financial) 
incentives to exercise result in ‘promoting’ spillovers (Dolan and Galizzi, 2013). 
These, among others, may be in line with ‘preference for consistency’ motives 
similar to the ones documented by the cognitive dissonance or foot-in-the-door 
literatures (Festinger, 1957; Freedman and Fraser, 1966; Cialdini, Trost, and 
Newsom, 1995). If, on the other hand, incentives lead to more calories consumed, 
then incentives (or nudges) result in ‘permitting’ spillovers. Several behavioural 
mechanisms can explain such ‘permitting’ spillovers. For instance, consistently 
with licensing effects (Monin and Miller, 2001; Cain et al., 2005), the reward and 
‘deservingness’ from being paid for effort provides a moral licence to later 
indulge more in food (Werle et al. 2010; Wisdom et al., 2010; Chiou et al., 
2011a,b; Van Kleef et al., 2011).  
Alternatively, consistent with ego-depletion effects, subjects who 
exercised hard under the strain of incentives, can then feel ‘depleted’ in their 
physical or mental energy after the task, and thus exert less self-control in 
restraining their intakes in the lunch (or, attempt to replete the pool of energy 
resources by consuming more glucose, which is converted from food into 
neurotransmitters: Baumeister et al., 1998; Gailliot et al., 2007).4 By explicitly 
asking subjects about their satisfaction with task performance as well as about 
their ‘energy depletion’ feeling, we are able to conduct explicit regression 
analysis to isolate the most likely mechanism beyond the spillovers. 
III. Results
Table 2 provides a description and the main descriptive statistics for all the 
variables in our experiment.5 We have directly checked whether each variable in 
the analysis is normally distributed using a standard skewness/kurtosis test for 
normality. The distributions for most variables are non-normal, and, therefore, in 
4 Of course, although not previously documented by the behavioural literature, other forms of ‘permitting’ spillovers are
possible in principle. For instance, high financial incentives can trigger higher cognitive attention to the fact of receiving 
money for the task. This, in turn, can induce subjects to pay more attention to the ‘reward’ aspect related to their 
participation in the experiment, and lead them to see their ‘overall reward’ for participating in the experiment as the sum of 
two parts: the financial rewards conditional to their physical task, plus the lunch offered afterwards. If so, one can speculate 
that, driven by the idea to maximize their ‘overall reward’, subjects can be eager to ‘take the most’ out of the experiment 
when walking into the room with the refreshments, and can thus eat more. 
5
 All the tables with descriptive statistics and estimates’ results are reported in the Appendix. 
what follows we report the results of the Mann-Whitney (two-sample Wilcoxon 
rank-sum) non-parametric tests. Following random assignment of subjects to 
treatments, there were no significant differences in background characteristics 
across treatments, including age (Age), gender (Female), weight (Weight), self-
assessed health (SAH), baseline levels of heart rate per minute (HRBefore), 
happiness (Happy), and hunger (Hungry), or weekly expense for accommodation 
(RentExpense, a proxy for income) (Table 3).  
An overview of the main results in the overall experiment, and across each 
experimental group, is provided in Tables 4 and 5. 
The first result concerns the effect of financial incentives for physical 
exercising. Paying subjects any conditional amount of money made subjects 
working harder in the stepping task. As can be seen in Table 4, subjects in both 
treatment groups with financial incentives performed a higher number of steps: 
the average number of steps (Steps) was about 102.55 in H, 105.54 in L, 92.48 in 
E, and 89.42 in C. The difference between the number of steps in the arms with 
financial incentives compared to the control group is both noticeable in size (12-
15 steps more) and statistically significant (p=0.0004 in H and p=0.0002 in L). 
The difference in the level of performed steps is generally reflected in the 
calculated individual difference between the two measures of the heart rate 
immediately before and after the stepping exercise (DiffHR): subjects in 
treatments H and L showed differences in heart rates of 62.4 and 68.67 pulses, 
compared to 63.38 pulses in treatment E, and 51.65 pulses in C. The differences 
between the financial incentives treatments and the control group are statistically 
significant at 0.05 level (p=0.0332 for H, p=0.0156 in L, whereas p=0.0778 for 
E). 
We then estimated the individual number of calories burned in the 
physical exercise based on subjects’ gender, age, weight, and heart rate 
immediately after the physical task. The calculation followed the models fitted by 
Keytel et al. (2005) for the cases where direct measures are not available for 
maximal oxygen consumption (so-called VO2max, which, in principle, can be 
measured by breathing into a mask during exercising: e.g. Canning et al. 2014). 
Although other models can be found in the literature, Keytel et al. (2005) gender-
specific equations have been widely adopted and validated and, as such, have also 
been used by numerous popular software, apps, and online calories calculators for 
physical exercises (e.g. www.shapesense.com). We thus estimated the calories 
burned in the physical exercise (KcalOut) for each subject in our sample based on 
their gender and age, and their directly measured weight and heart rate (after the 
task). The average estimated calories burned across treatments were Kcal=16.95 
in H; Kcal=16.61 in L; Kcal=15.40 in E; and Kcal=13.26 in C. The differences 
between the financial incentives treatments and the control group are statistically 
significant at 0.05 level (p=0.0293 for H, p=0.0376 in L, while the difference is 
not statistically significant for E, with p=0.2176). 
Interestingly, the difference in the objective indicators of physical effort 
across the treatments does not merely reflect an analogous pattern for the 
subjective perception of the effort (DiffEnergy), which was measured as the 
individual difference between the values (on a 0-10 scale) of the responses to the 
question on ‘how full of energy’ the participants felt immediately before and after 
the stepping task scale. While the subjects in treatments H and E showed 
comparable levels of decay in their perceived feeling ‘full of energy’ (0.225 and 
0.243, respectively), a much more pronounced decrease in energy was perceived 
by subjects in treatment L: 1.128 out of 10. Subjects in treatment C reported to 
feel even fuller of energy after the physical task, with responses characterised by 
an increase of 0.131 out of 10. Only in treatment L, however, is the perceived 
energy decay significantly different from the control group (p=0.4330 for H, 
p=0.0182 for L, and p=0.3759 for E). 
The patterns for the objectively measured and subjectively perceived 
effort are also substantially different from what emerges from the self-assessed 
level of immediate satisfaction (on a 0-10 scale) related to the just accomplished 
task (ImSatisf). Here, again, the subjects exposed to high or low financial 
incentives, despite performing substantially the same number of steps, showed 
very distinct patterns of satisfaction for the completed task. Such a divergence, 
however, does not mirror the one for the perceived effort: while subjects in group 
H rated their own performance with an outstanding 8.42, subjects in the L group 
rated it as 7.06, with a difference from the control group (6.39) which is 
statistically significant only for treatment H (p<0.0001 for H, p=0.0921 for L). 
Moreover, the value of satisfaction for the stepping among subjects in treatment E 
(7.49) is also statistically higher than the one reported in the control group 
(p=0.0012).  
Thus, although changes in the level of the financial incentives did not turn 
out to affect objectively measured performance, it substantially altered subjects’ 
perception of the performance. The latter, in turn, can represent a behavioural 
mechanism driving potential spillover effects between the incentivised task and 
other, subsequent, tasks. When, at the very end of the experiment, subjects were 
asked again how much satisfied they were with the performed task (EndSatisf), 
although all subjects reported lower levels of satisfaction than reported 
immediately after the task, the main differences across treatments substantially 
persisted over the course of the experiment: in group C subjects reported on 
average a satisfaction level of 6.04, which was significantly lower than in 
treatments H (7.9, p<0.0001), E (7.13, p=0.0035), and L (6.81, p=0.0280). 
In the lunch after the stepping task, subjects in treatment H consumed 
significantly higher calories (KcalIn) than in the control group (432.9 versus 
233.09 Kcal, p=0.0017). The differences in the calories consumed in treatments L 
and E are only marginally significant (319.23 Kcal, p=0.0673 and 350.12 Kcal, 
p=0.0538, respectively). Looking in greater detail to the caloric consumption for 
each item (Table 6), compared to the control group, subjects in treatment H 
consumed a significantly higher amount of calories in crisps (79.2 versus 13.89 
Kcal, p<0.0001), drinks (86.45 versus 37 Kcal, p=0.0001), and sweets (97.72 
versus 38.31 Kcal, p=0.0643). As a result, subjects in H also consumed 
significantly higher intakes of fats (p=0.0004), saturated fats (p=0.0024), sugars 
(p<0.0001), and salt (p=0.0305) than in C. The differences in the calories 
consumed in each category of food are not statistically significant for subjects in 
treatments L and E. 
The number of total calories consumed, minus the above calculated 
number of calories burned, was then used to define a new variable (ExcessKcal, 
Table 4) capturing the net balance between ‘calories in’ and ‘calories out’ and the 
extent to which, during the subsequent meal, subjects in our experiment 
replenished the calories spent in the physical task. As it can be seen, this 
difference is positive and conspicuous in all treatments: subjects consumed more 
than what they burned for 415.94 Kcal in group H; 302.62 Kcal in L; 334.72 Kcal 
in E; and 219.77 Kcal in C. The excess balance, however, is statistically higher 
than in the control group only in treatment H (p=0.0020) while is only marginally 
higher for group E (p=0.0682). 
A look at subjects’ answers in the control questions in task 3 helps 
assessing the extent to which subjects were able to correctly predict the amount of 
calories burned (EstKcalOut) and consumed (EstKcalIn). On average subjects, 
thought to have burned about 80.34 Kcal in the physical task, which is clearly an 
over-estimate of the real number of calories burned (between 13 and 17 Kcal). 
The estimated number of calories burned in the two treatments with financial 
incentives (and higher number of steps) is significantly higher than in the control 
group (69.39 in H and 112.12 in L compared with 58.95 in C, with p=0.0385 and 
p=0.0165, respectively). A partly different picture emerges concerning the 
question on the estimated amount of calories consumed in the lunch. The average 
predicted figure of 196.76 Kcal is clearly an under-estimation of the actual caloric 
intakes (335.10 Kcal). The estimated number of calories consumed, however, is 
not statistically significantly different across the groups (200.61 Kcal in H; 170.83 
in L; 246.43 in E; and 169.03 in C). 
The results are fully confirmed by formal regression analysis, which 
allows to account and control for, broadly defined, individual heterogeneity. A 
second look at the data shows that the significant differences in the average 
number of excess calories across treatments are due to two, conceptually distinct, 
factors. First, while in the control group 71.05 percent of the subjects chose to 
have lunch, 90, 84.62, and 76.92 percent of the subjects did it in treatments H, L, 
and E, respectively, with the proportion being significantly higher for group H 
(p=0.0169, while only marginally higher in L, with p=0.0756). Second, among 
the ones who indeed chose to have lunch at first place, how much they decided to 
eat or drink also varied across treatments: the average calories consumption for 
the subjects who had lunch - that is, E(KcalIn | KcalIn>0) - in fact, was of 481 
Kcal (SD 273.91) in group H, 377.28 Kcal (SD 269.92) in group L, 455 Kcal (SD 
240.95) in group E, and 327.98 Kcal (SD 318.03) in the control group, whose 
average consumption is significantly different from treatments H (p=0.0191) and 
E (p=0.0212).  
An appropriate and flexible approach to analysis thus uses a two-part (or 
hurdle) model. We model, accordingly, the two decisions of i) whether or not to 
consume anything at lunch, and then ii) how many excess calories to eat or drink, 
as generated by potentially different underlying mechanisms. In particular, the 
first part of the hurdle model consists of a binary choice whether to have lunch 
(KcalIn>0) or not (KcalIn=0) modelled by a standard probit taking values 1 or 0, 
respectively.6 We then model the second part using a linear regression model in 
logs to describe how many calories subjects decided to consume in excess of the 
calories burned, given the option to have lunch, that is, E(Ln ExcessKcal 
|ExcessKcal>0). To enhance the comparability of results in the two separate parts, 
we use analogous sets and subsets of regressors in the two estimations. 
6
 Given the limited amount of calories that could be burned in the physical exercise, and our specific choice of food 
items, whose minimum caloric intake was of 47 Kcal (i.e. an apple), the fact that a subject consumed any entire food or 
drink item (KcalIn > 0) automatically implies that also their excess calories balances were in fact strictly positive 
(ExcessKcal > 0). 
In Tables 7-8 in the Appendix, we thus present a set of probit estimations 
for i) whether the subjects decided to consume anything at the lunch after the task. 
The dependent variable is the observed choice to have lunch (KcalIn > 0) or not 
(KcalIn =0), while the explanatory and control variables are the treatment 
dummies (TreatH, TreatL, TreatE), and a set of individual characteristics 
including: subjects’ gender  (Female); the baseline level of hunger before the task 
(Hunger); the number of performed steps (Steps); the differences in heart rates 
(DiffHR); the difference in feeling full of energy (DiffEnergy); the subjective 
estimates of calories burned (EstKcalOut, while the estimate for calories 
consumed EstKcalIn is clearly omitted because of endogeneity); the feelings of 
satisfaction with the task (ImSatisf).  
In Table 7, a simple probit model (Model 1) where the only independent 
variables are the dummies for the treatments, shows that subjects in the high 
incentive group were significantly more likely to have lunch after the stepping (at 
0.05 level). This effect is fully robust to the introduction in the model of variables 
controlling for subjects’ gender, level of hunger, and time passed since their last 
meal (Models 2-4), where it also emerges that hungrier subjects were, intuitively, 
more likely to have lunch (always significant at least at 0.05 level). The effect of 
being assigned to the high-incentive group appears robust to alternative 
specifications including variables that control for the objective or perceived level 
of effort, such as the number of completed steps, the feeling of being energy 
depleted, or the objective change in the heart rate, none of which have significant 
effects (Models 5-7).  
When, in Table 8, also the subjective estimate of the calories burned in the 
stepping task is introduced as an explanatory variable, its effect is significant (at 
0.05 level), with a corresponding reduced level of significance in the treatment H 
dummy (Model 9). Substantially the same occurs when the variable capturing the 
level of satisfaction with the performance is directly introduced in the analysis 
(Model 10). A specification testing the joint effect of the latter two variables 
suggests that the key significant driver beyond the decision to have lunch appears 
to be the perception of the burned calories (Model 11). Together, these findings 
signal that the higher likelihood that subjects in group H decided to have lunch is 
partly mediated by their satisfaction with the task, and, especially, by their 
perception of having burned more calories in the stepping exercise.7 
In Tables 9-11 in the Appendix, we model the second part for ii) how 
many excess calories the subjects consumed in the lunch, conditional to having 
7 An explicit analysis (available on request) excludes the hypothesis of significant interaction effects between the
treatment groups, on the one hand, and either the subjective perception of the calories burned, or the level of satisfaction, 
on the other, suggesting that the effects of the latter variables are substantially symmetric across groups.  
lunch. We thus present a set of OLS regressions with heteroskedatisc-robust 
standard errors where the dependent variable is the log of the, individually 
calculated, balance between ‘calories in’ and ‘calories-out’ (Ln ExcessKcal | 
ExcessKcal>0) and the explanatory and control variables are the ones above. As 
can be seen in Table 9, in the simplest model where the only independent 
variables are the dummies for the treatments (Model 12), subjects in the high 
incentive and the ‘nudge’ groups consumed significantly more excess calories in 
the lunch (about 60-62 percent more calories than in the baseline, significant at a 
0.05 level). The two treatment effects are fully robust and remain consistently 
significant at 0.05 level also when more variables are introduced to control for 
subjects’ gender (with females tending to consume less calories), level of hunger, 
and time passed since their last meal (Models 13-16).  
From Table 10, the effect of being assigned to either the 10p incentive or 
the encouragement treatment appear robust to alternative specifications 
controlling also for the objective or perceived level of effort: none of variables for 
the number of completed steps, the perceived level of energy depletion, or the 
objective change in the heart rate have significant effects (Models 18-23). The 
significance of the two treatment effects remains unaltered also when the analysis 
controls for the subjective estimate of the calories burned in the stepping task 
(Model 25, Table 8). The higher calories consumption of subjects in group H, and 
to a lesser extent E, however, is mostly mediated by their level of satisfaction with 
the just accomplished task: when it is also included in the analysis, in fact, the 
level of satisfaction of the subjects is significant at 0.05 level while the 
significance level of the treatment dummies disappears or declines (Model 26). 
The explicit inclusion of interaction terms (Model 27) shows that the effect of the 
most satisfied subjects in groups H and E is significant (at least at 0.05 level): in 
both treatments, an increase of one point of satisfaction within the 0-10 scale 
accounts for an increase of about 30 percent in the level of calories consumption 
compared to the baseline group (about 70 Kcal more).  
Overall, the results from the two-part model estimates suggest that the 
likelihood to whether or not to have lunch was mainly explained by the level of 
hunger of the subjects, and by their subjective perception of how many calories 
they had burned during the stepping task. These two variables, however, were not 
the key drivers of how many calories subjects consumed during the lunch. The 
caloric intakes were instead mainly explained by participants’ gender and by the 
high level of satisfaction with the accomplished stepping task, induced by the 
high monetary rewards or by the verbal encouragement. All these findings 
reinstate the importance of explicitly elicit and control for subjects’ satisfaction 
with the experimental task. In absence of such a direct indicator, one could be led 
to conclude that, to drive the different ‘permitting’ spillovers following the 
incentivised task was merely the presence of different levels of financial 
incentives. In light of the direct evidence on the subjective feelings for the task, 
we can instead infer that the spillovers were not just triggered by the presence of 
different monetary incentives per se, but, rather, it was mediated by the impact 
that these had on the subjective level of satisfaction. 
We also conducted a broad set of robustness checks and variants of the 
empirical models (all available on request) mainly by: i) using the dependent 
variable ExcessKcal in levels rather than logs; ii) focusing the analysis on a sub-
sample where few ‘outliers’ values were ‘trimmed’ off (e.g. three subjects 
consumed more than 1,000 calories at lunch, one in each of the groups H, L, and 
C); iii) using KcalIn as an alternative dependent variable (in both levels and logs); 
iv) using as dependent variables either the number of calories consumed in each
food category (e.g. sandwiches, sweets, drinks), or more refined classes of 
nutritional intakes (e.g. sugars, fats, saturated fats, sodium); v) using discrete 
choice models for the likelihood that a subject consumed ‘healthy’, or ‘energy 
dense’ items within each food category (e.g. sandwiches, side dishes, drinks). 
Typically, the set of robustness estimates provide substantially identical results: 
the general message is that subjects in treatment H tended to consume more, 
absolute or excess, calories; higher intakes of fats, saturated fats, sugars, and salt, 
and more energy-dense food and drink items.  
Overall, the evidence from the main findings and the regression analysis 
documents the existence of spillover effects in presence of high financial 
incentives, and seems to bring forward particular support to an interpretation of 
such spillovers in light of the ‘licensing’ behavioural account: although they, in 
fact, exercised as hard as subjects who received just 2p per step, subjects 
rewarded with high financial incentives felt a higher sense of ‘satisfaction’ once 
they accomplished the physical exercise task. This higher feeling of satisfaction 
fed into a sense that they had accomplished something which ‘deserved a treat’. 
Higher satisfaction and feelings of deservingness were also induced by verbal 
encouragement in the ‘nudge’ arm, although to a lesser extent. On the one hand, 
this should not come as a surprise given that our experimental manipulation 
repeatedly exposed the participants to the idea that they were ‘doing very well’, 
although, in fact, they did no better than in the control group. On the other hand, 
this brings forward more evidence in support of the idea that it was the 
satisfaction with the task the key mediator of the ‘licensing’ spillovers.8  
8
 This last finding is generally consistent with the evidence that verbal reinforcements, that is, telling experimental 
subjects that they did well on a task, have strong positive effects on self-reported measures of intrinsic satisfaction (Deci et 
al., 1999; Fehr and Falk, 2002; Fischbach and Choi, 2012).  
IV. Discussion and conclusion
In this work, we have directly explored the existence and nature of 
unintended short-term spillover effects of health incentives using a controlled lab-
field experiment. We tested three main questions: i) whether such spillover effects 
exist; ii) whether they depend on the size (high versus low) and the nature 
(financial versus non-financial) of the incentives; and iii) which behavioural 
mechanisms are most likely to drive the spillover effects. 
The main results suggest that financial incentives are effective in 
influencing physical exercise and that different incentives have a profound effect 
on subsequent eating behaviour. That financial incentives work, and work better 
than non-financial nudges, is not too surprising to economists. What is perhaps 
less expected is the relative high number of steps performed by the subjects in the 
C group, which is most likely due to the experimenter demand effect (Bardsley, 
2005; Levitt and List, 2007a,b; Zizzo, 2010): participants could have tried to 
‘please’ the experimenter, by behaving in the way they believed the experimenter 
wanted them to behave.9 Our experiment also indicates that both high and low 
financial incentives are equally effective in inducing directly observed physical 
exercise. This result complements the findings by Charness and Gneezy (2009) 
9
 This may be confirmed by the fact that both close scrutiny and face-to-face communication, which have been 
identified by Levitt and List (2007a,b) to be factors facilitating the experimenter demand effects, were indeed present in 
our experimental manipulation. 
who found an asymmetric effect of low and high incentives on gym attendance. 
More generally, our result is in line with the overall findings reviewed by 
Camerer and Hogarth (1999): while introducing incentives often matters, ‘raising 
incentives from some modest level L to a higher level H is more likely to have no 
effect’ on average performance.  
The second result on the relationship between ‘calories in’ and ‘calories 
out’ in our experiment is particularly remarkable. In general, slightly more 
calories out meant considerably more calories in. This confirms the concern that 
the obesity problem cannot be effectively dealt solely by incentivising physical 
exercise. If more physical exercise disproportionately ‘works up an appetite’ and 
feeds into a bigger meal later on, it is unlikely that intervening only on the 
‘calories out’ channel is an effective way to curb and reverse the on-going 
overweight trends (Church et al. 2007; Westerterp and Speakman, 2008; 
Swinburn et al. 2009; Foster-Schubert et al. 2012; Sonneville et al. 2012; Saint-
Maurice et al. 2014). The fact that the under-estimated calories-in did not 
significantly differ across experimental treatments, rejects the possibility that 
were just different perceptions of calories consumed which led to higher caloric 
intakes in treatment H and E.  
The resulting difference of 219.77 excess calories in the baseline group 
seems partly explained by distorted subjective perceptions of the number of 
‘calories in’. Subjects in the C group, in fact, underestimated the number of 
calories they consumed by an order of about 60 calories (estimated 169.03 Kcal 
versus actual 233.04 Kcal). For a food and health policy perspective this is 
generally consistent with the idea that disclosure of full nutritional information, 
per se, does not seem to be sufficient to automatically prevent perceptive biases: 
although each food and drink item clearly reported full nutritional information 
and was marked with information on the most salient nutritional facts, subjects 
still fell prey to a systematic, and conspicuous, under-estimation of their caloric 
intakes (Wansink and Chandon, 2006; Chandon and Wansink, 2007; Downs et al. 
2009; Currie et al. 2010; Galizzi, 2014).  
In a related way, the Kcal-in/Kcal-out baseline difference of 219.77 
calories is also explained, to a lesser extent, by an over-estimation of ‘calories 
out’. Subjects in the C group overestimated the number of calories they burned by 
a factor of four (estimated 58.94 Kcal versus actual 13.27 kcal). The over-
estimation of the calories spent in the physical exercise, paired with the under-
estimation of calories consumed thus appear candidate twinned reasons to explain 
the mis-calculation of the baseline Kcal-in/Kcal-out balance, accounting for 
nearly half of it (110 of 219.77 calories). This is generally consistent with the idea 
that over-eating may be partly favoured by confused perception about the exact 
caloric and nutritional intakes, and the exact relationships between burning and 
consuming calories, as pointed out by the literature on the obesity and the 
physical inactivity pandemics (Cutler et al. 2003; Finkelstein et al. 2005; Rosin, 
2008; Mazzocchi et al. 2009; Kohl et al. 2012; Ruhm, 2012; Downs et al. 2013; 
Papoutsi et al. 2013; Canning et al. 2014). 
Our results suggest the existence of spillover effects related to high 
financial incentives, and, to a less extent, also to ‘nudges’ targeting health 
behaviour: subjects in groups H and E, tended to consume significantly more 
excess calories in the lunch than in the control group. In particular, the average 
difference between H and C is about 200 Kcal (or about 20 minutes more 
exercising).  Thus, clearly, the difference in the excess calories balance between 
the H and C group cannot be attributed to a physiological replenishment of the 
calories spent in the physical exercise.  
The findings directly allow us to exclude some of the behavioural 
accounts as plausible explanations beyond the spillovers. Since high incentives 
led to more, rather than less, ‘calories in’, we can immediately rule out all forms 
of promoting spillover. The idea that financial incentives can decrease the 
likelihood of promoting spillovers has also been discussed by Thøgersen and 
Crompton (2009) and Evans et al. (2013) in the context of pro-environmental 
behaviours.  
Among the various permitting spillovers we are left with, the ego 
depletion account is not a fully convincing explanation here. Subjects in group L, 
in fact, exercised as hard as their peers in group H in terms of completed steps, 
manifested even higher heart rate gradients and, perhaps more importantly, felt 
more tired (actually, Steps, DiffHR and DiffEnergy take the highest scores in 
group L). Nevertheless, subjects in L did not consume significantly more excess 
calories than in C. Moreover, in no specification of the regression analysis the 
effect of the variables that should capture the ‘energy depleted’ feeling turns out 
to be significant: neither Steps, nor DiffHR, nor DiffEnergy are significant 
determinants of the choice to whether have lunch or not, nor of the decision of 
how many excess calories to consume.  
Also the above mentioned ‘take-the-most-out-of-it’ behavioural account is 
at odds with our evidence. In fact, if the main behavioural explanation beyond 
spillovers is that subjects were led to pay more attention to the ‘overall reward’ 
(as the sum of the rewards related to the physical task, plus the lunch offered 
afterwards) this account would manifest itself asymmetrically across treatments H 
and L. In particular, coherently with the idea that people eat more when they have 
high desire for money (Briers et al. 2006), subjects who already earned high 
earnings for the physical task (H) would be less likely to fall prey of the 
‘permitting’ spillovers than subjects who received small rewards for the main task 
(L). This was not the case.10 
The most plausible explanation beyond our findings are licensing 
spillovers. This behavioural explanation is mainly underpinned by subjects in H 
also manifesting higher levels of immediate satisfaction with the accomplished 
task. Being satisfied with the task is significantly associated to a higher likelihood 
of having lunch and consuming more excess calories. These calories, moreover, 
mainly took the form of tasty, energy dense, drinks and side dishes, such as crisps, 
which are hard to explain with the ‘glucose repletion’ physiological roots behind 
ego depletion. Both aspects go along quite well with the ‘licensing’ behavioural 
account predicting that subjects, perhaps unconsciously, felt entitled to ‘treat’ 
themselves after what they saw as a good deed.  
10 Such a behavioural account, moreover, is partly in contrast with the experimenter demand effect well documented in
experimental economics: rather than attempting to take the most out of the experimenter, experimental subjects tend to take 
actions and decisions which, they believe, can please the experimenter (see also Bardsley, 2005; Levitt and List, 2007a,b; 
Zizzo, 2010). Furthermore, the higher cognitive attention to the rewards could not be merely explained by priming subjects 
to money (rather than health), since also in the C group subjects participated into a lottery with a chance to win money. 
Thus if priming is the behavioural explanation of the higher cognitive attention to rewards, it has necessarily to do with 
effects specifically triggered by conditional financial incentives, rather than generic money priming. The possibility of such 
specific effects, however, is in contrast with the evidence that a broad range of behaviours are pervasively activated by 
priming the generic concept of money (Vohs et al., 2006; Zhou et al., 2009). Since spillovers are documented also in 
treatment E, that implies no money whatsoever, such a ‘money priming’ account is not a plausible explanation either. 
Our main results are thus consistent with the findings by Wisdom et al. 
(2010) who also documented ‘deservingness’ feelings and ‘licensing’ effects of 
making healthy options more salient in the menus, in particular in the form of 
more indulgent choices of side dishes and drinks. Our findings relate, more 
generally, to several other studies documenting health-related ‘permitting’ 
spillovers (Wilcox et al. 2009; Werle et al. 2010; Chiou et al. 2011a,b; De Witt et 
al. 2011; Van Kleef et al. 2011), and extend the evidence also to the case of 
financial incentives in health, an area of increasing research and policy interest 
(Loewenstein et al., 2007, 2012; Marteau et al., 2009; Volpp et al. 2011; Baicker 
et al., 2012).  
From this perspective, our main results are, more broadly, in line with the 
rapidly growing literature documenting ‘moral licensing’ in a variety of contexts 
(Benabou and Tirole, 2011): from discriminatory behaviour (Monin and Miller, 
2001; Effron et al., 2009) to purchasing decisions (Strahilevitz and Myers, 1998; 
Dhar and Simonson, 1999; Khan and Dhar, 2006), from advising (Cain et al., 
2005) to charitable giving (Sachdeva et al., 2009), from pro-social behaviour  
(Merritt et al. 2010, 2012; Jordan, et al. 2011; Conway and Peetz, 2012; Brañas-
Garza et al. 2013; Cornelissen et al. 2013; Gneezy et al. 2012; Gneezy et al. 2014) 
to green choices and environmental behaviour (Thøgersen, 1999; Thøgersen and 
Olander, 2003; Thøgersen and Crompton, 2009; Mazar and Zhong, 2009; 
Jacobsen et al. 2012; Evans et al. 2013; Tiefenbeck, et al. 2013).  
Our evidence also contributes to the recent attempts to identify the 
boundary conditions that facilitate the occurrence of permitting behavioural 
spillovers as opposed to promoting ones (Bargh et al. 2001; Dijksterhuis and 
Bargh, 2001; Schwarz and Bless, 2005; Baumeister et al. 2007; Gneezy et al. 
2012; Dolan and Galizzi, 2013; Fishbach et al. 2014). Gneezy et al. (2012), for 
instance, show that moral licensing is more likely to occur in pro-social situations 
when the first behaviour is costless, while consistency effects emerge when the 
first behaviour involves some costs. Our results are generally in line with these 
findings, adding the consideration that what seems to matter is the overall 
‘bundle’ of relative costs and incentives. In our experiment, the first behaviour 
was inherently costly and demanding in physical terms, pointing to promoting 
spillovers (if any) at the baseline. The fact that the treated subjects were paid 
salient sums of money (or were repeatedly praised) for such costly activity could 
have ‘washed out’ the perception of costs and converted the resulting effect into a 
permitting spillover. This would also explain the asymmetry across high and low 
financial incentives: in the latter case subjects felt more tired after an objectively 
identical exercise, but less satisfied of their own performance. 
Furthermore, our analysis shows that it is possible to empirically 
disentangle, to some extent, the behavioural mechanism underlying the 
‘permitting’ spillovers. One practical way to do it is to directly assess the level of 
subjects’ satisfaction with a performed experimental task, and to look at how this 
predicts the behaviour in a following task. To the best of our knowledge, ours is 
the first experiment exploring this avenue, and there certainly seems to be broader 
scope to combine and integrate measures of satisfaction and behavioural 
outcomes (Dolan and Galizzi, 2014).  
By documenting licensing effects of high financial rewards, our work also 
relates to the increasing behavioural literature on the ‘hidden costs’ of incentives: 
the general message that seems to emerge is that, although financial incentives 
generally work well, they may also have ‘unintended consequences’: for instance, 
they can ‘crowd out’ intrinsic motivation, change social norms, interact in 
unpredictable ways with reciprocity, reputation, and social comparison concerns, 
or lead subjects to feel anxious and ‘choke under pressure’ (Frey and Oberholzer-
Gee, 1997; Fehr and Gachter, 1997; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000a,b; Fehr and 
Falk, 2002; Benabou and Tirole, 2003, 2006; Heyman and Ariely, 2004; Ariely et 
al., 2009a,b).  
At the same time, our results also relate to the experimental literature on 
the effects and psychological consequences of money. On the one hand, our 
experiment confirms that, as the key target behaviour is concerned, small 
variations in (modest) monetary rewards do not radically affect average 
performances (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999; Pokorny, 2008; Ariely et al. 2009). 
On the other, however, it also confirms that high and low amounts of money can 
have different ‘carryover’ effects (Lea and Webley, 2006). For instance, subjects 
previously primed with high amounts of money, exhibited more self-sufficient 
behaviour (e.g. waited longer before asking for help, helped a stranger to a lesser 
extent) in a following task, while this did not occur for subjects primed with low 
amounts of money, whose behaviour did not differ from the control group (Vohs 
et al., 2006, 2008). 
Further research is needed to explicitly explore the degree to which 
spillover effects are domain-specific. Most of the evidence at date, in fact, 
considers licensing and other behavioural spillovers occurring within the same 
domain, such as health, environmental, or pro-social behaviour. There is only 
little evidence on whether behavioural spillovers can occur across different 
domains, and, if so, on whether cross-domains spillovers are more likely to be 
permitting or promoting (Khan and Dhar, 2006; Mazar and Zhong, 2010; 
Sachdeva, et al. 2009; Baird et al. 2012; Dolan and Galizzi, 2013). Our lab-field 
setting can be naturally extended to look at spillovers effects of incentives across 
different domains. For instance, one can consider incentives targeting a cognitive, 
instead of a physical exercise, task. Subjects, for example, can be given a bunch 
of papers with different puzzles or maze tests, be asked to solve as many as they 
can, and then be kept waiting in a room arranged with various foods and drinks. 
Similar cross-domains extensions are left for future work. 
More generally, further evidence is due in order to map the various factors 
and interactions that facilitate licensing and other behavioural spillovers in 
presence of incentives, for instance in terms of the completeness, concreteness, 
proximity, and complementarity of the two behaviours, or of the various trade-
offs that they involve (Dhar and Simonson, 1999; Fishbach and Dhar, 2005; 
Fishbach and Zhang, 2008; Mazar and Zhong, 2010; Conway and Peetz, 2012; 
Fishbach and Choi, 2012; Gneezy, et al., 2012; Cornelissen, et al., 2013; Dolan 
and Galizzi, 2013; Fischbach et al. 2014). 
Two clear limitations of our study are that it considers a sample of 
students instead of subjects who suffer from actual health problems related to 
overeating or obesity; and that, by its very design, it only looks at short-term 
spillovers of one-off incentives. In principle, in fact, it is possible that subjects 
who ate more in the buffet lunch outside the lab could have then eaten less later 
on that same day. In theory one can even speculate that the overall nutritional 
intake at the end of the day could be not significantly further away from the 
‘optimum’ across the different treatments. One could also counter-argue that if 
spillovers are documented even in such a short time window, they would be even 
more, not less, likely to occur when considering longer time frames. It is possible, 
however, that incentives for repeated, rather than one-off behavioural change, 
could instead lead to habit formation, reinforcing behaviour, or other promoting 
spillovers. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, if further confirmed in other contexts, 
the finding that high, but not low, financial incentives might have ‘permitting’ 
spillovers even in the short term has a number of practical implications. From a 
research methodology perspective, caution is due when interpreting the results of 
experiments whose design involves sequences of incentivised and non-
incentivised tasks: for instance, subjects who perceive they have done well in a 
task where they could earn high financial incentives (e.g. an experimental game, 
incentive-compatible tests to elicitation preferences) might later feel ‘licensed’ to 
behave differently in a following unrelated task where incentives are absent (e.g. a 
questionnaire, the elicitation of psychological traits, a field manipulation). From a 
policy perspective, in several health contexts modest financial incentives can 
prove to work equally well as higher financial rewards, while being more cost-
effective. At the same time, small financial incentives may present lower risks of 
unintended spillovers which might dampen, or even totally offset, the overall 
envisaged benefits of an intervention. Behavioural economists, especially those 
seeking to inform policy, should try to broadly account for how one behaviour can 
spillover to the next: no behaviour, after all, sits in a vacuum. 
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Appendix: Tables. 
Table 1: Distribution of subjects across timeslots and treatments. 
Timeslot 
Treatment 11.00 12.00 13.00 14.00 15.00 Total 
H 6 10 8 7 9 40 
15.00 25.00 20.00 17.50 22.50 100.00 
21.43 25.87 25.00 20.59 33.33 25.64 
L 8 9 7 8 7 39 
20.51 23.08 17.95 20.51 17.95 100.00 
28.57 25.71 21.88 23.53 25.93 25.00 
E 8 5 11 10 5 39 
20.51 12.82 28.21 25.64 12.82 100.00 
28.57 14.29 34.38 29.41 18.52 25.00 
C 6 11 6 9 6 38 
17.95 22.44 20.51 21.79 17.31 100.00 
Total 28 35 32 34 27 156 
Table 2: Description of the Variables and Main Descriptive Statistics 
Independent and dependent variables 
Description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Steps Number of completed steps 97.583 18.239 51 145 
DiffHR 
Difference in directly 
measured heart rate before 
and after the stepping task 
(in bpm) 
61.953 26.530 3 173 
DiffEnergy 
Difference in self-
assessed ‘full of energy’ 
feeling before and after the 
stepping task (on a 0-10 
Likert scale) 
0.369 2.059 -6 6 
ImSatisf 
Self-assessed satisfaction 
with the performance in the 
stepping task immediately 
after the task (on a 0-10 
Likert scale) 
7.356 1.712 0 10 
EndSatisf 
Self-assessed satisfaction 
with the performance in the 
stepping task at the end of 
the experiment (on a 0-10 
Likert scale) 
6.981 1.753 1 10 
KcalIn 
Total number of calories 
from food and drink items 
consumed in the lunch (in 
Kcal) 
335.105 299.444 0 1,504.5 
KcalOut 
Number of calories 
burned in the stepping 
exercise based on subject’s 
gender, age, and directly 
measured weight and heart 
rate after the task (in Kcal)  
15.582 6.587 0 26.478 
ExcessKcal Computed difference (TotalKcalIn – CalBurned) 319.522 299.488 -24.693 1,488.3 
EstKcalOut 
Subject’s estimate of 
number of calories burned 
in the stepping exercise 
(open end) 
80.430 122.558 2 1,000 
EstKcalIn 
Subject’s estimate of 
number of calories from all 
food and drink items 
consumed in the lunch 
(open end) 
196.767 238.085 0 1,700 
Hunger 
Self-assessed level of 
hunger before the lunch (on 
a 180 mm slider scale) 
52.974 35.937 0 152 
Independent and dependent variables (continued) 
Description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
KcalSandw 
Total number of calories 
from sandwiches consumed 
in the lunch (in Kcal) 
160.663 208.312 0 899 
KcalCrisps 
Total number of calories 
from crisps consumed in 
the lunch (in Kcal) 
35.115 61.558 0 264 
KcalSweets 
Total number of calories 
from sweets (excluding 
fruits) consumed in the 
lunch (in Kcal) 
85.692 136.694 0 587 
KcalDrinks 
Total number of calories 
from drinks consumed in 
the lunch (in Kcal) 
53.634 63.788 0 327 
Fats 
Total number of fats 
intakes consumed in the 
lunch (in grams) 
10.440 10.646 0 43.1 
SatFats 
Total number of 
saturated fats intakes 
consumed in the lunch (in 
grams) 
3.077 3.970 0 18.9 
Sugars 
Total number of sugars 
intakes consumed in the 
lunch (in grams) 
23.090 22.193 0 125.9 
Salt 
Total number of sodium 
salt intakes consumed in the 
lunch (in grams) 
0.713 0.864 0 4.03 
Female Female gender (dummy) 0.655 0.476 0 1 
Age Age (in years) 25.467 6.288 18 55 
Weight Directly measured weight (in kilograms) 63.767 13.368 42.7 107 
RentExpense Weekly rent expenditure (in GBP per week) 167.229 128.474 0 800 
SAH Self-assessed health (1=very poor, 5=excellent) 3.629 0.816 2 5 
HRBefore 
Directly measured heart 
rate before the stepping task 
(in bpm) 
78.52 13.784 11 114 
Happy Baseline happiness level (on a 0-10 Likert scale) 7.107 1.571 3 10 
TreatH/L/E 
Dummy variables for 
treatment groups H, L, E 
respectively 
- - 0 1 
SatH/L/E Interaction terms with ImSatisf variable - - - - 
LastEat Self-reported time passed from last meal (in minutes) 189.532 223.755 0 1,290 
Table 3. Baseline characteristics across treatments 
H L E C Total 
Age 25.62 26.51 25.12 24.63 25.47 
(5.69) (6.53) (7.87) (4.72) (6.28) 
Female 0.60 0.65 0.67 0.71 0.65 
(0.49) (0.48) (0.47) (0.46) (0.47) 
Weight 63.4 65.32 63.14 63.21 63.77 
(12.44) (15.87) (11.29) (13.88) (13.37) 
RentExpense 175.81 158.21 173.61 160.73 167.23 
(133.76) (131.51) (149.71) (98.61) (128.47) 
SAH 3.6 3.62 3.59 3.71 3.62 
(0.87) (0.92) (0.82) (0.65) (0.81) 
HRBefore 82.67* 78.05 75.80 77.16 75.82 
(12.95) (16.42) (10.43) (14.21) (13.78) 
Happy 7.10 7.14 6.97 7.21 7.11 
(1.69) (1.31) (1.58) (1.71) (1.57) 
Hunger 48.17 62.05 52.77 49.39 52.97 
(39.41) (35.27) (35.24) (33.11) (35.94) 
Observations 40 39 39 38 156 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
Results of two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test between the treatment group 
and group C:  
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
Table 4. Overview of main results: Wilcoxon rank-sum test between treatment group and C 
H L E C Total 
Steps 102.55*** 105.54*** 92.49 89.42 97.58 
(13.35) (19.15) (18.55) (16.91) (18.24) 
DiffHR 64.4** 68.67** 63.39* 51.66 61.95 
(22.93) (28.66) (25.25) (27.18) (26.53) 
DiffEnergy 0.225 1.128** 0.243 -0.132 0.368 
(1.746) (2.105) (1.716) (2.462) (2.059) 
ImmSatisf 8.425*** 7.064* 7.487*** 6.394 7.355 
(1.059) (1.857) (1.519) (1.701) (1.712) 
EndSatisf 7.9*** 6.807** 7.128*** 6.039 6.981 
(1.516) (1.768) (1.417) (1.817) (1.753) 
KcalIn 432.9*** 319.23* 350.12* 233.04 335.10 
(297.81) (283.49) (286.44) (306.26) (299.44) 
KcalOut 16.95** 16.61** 15.402 13.27 15.58 
(5.817) (6.424) (6.279) (7.385) (6.587) 
ExcessKcal 415.94*** 302.62 334.72* 219.77 319.52 
(299.69) (284.07) (286.23) (305.34) (299.48) 
EstKcalOut 69.39** 112.12** 84.35 58.94 80.34 
(61.42) (183.63) (120.58) (98.68) (122.56) 
EstKcalIn 200.61 170.83 246.43 169.03 196.77 
(306.89) (163.81) (247.00) (207.05) (238.08) 
Observations 40 39 39 38 156 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
Table 5: Overview of Nutritional Outcomes, in Detail 
H L E C Total 
KcalSandw 169.52 155.49 173.15 143.83 160.66 
(222.02) (186.69) (198.35) (230.35) (208.31) 
KcalCrisps 79.2*** 20.31 25.38 13.89 35.11 
(77.94) (45.81) (51.60) (41.05) (61.56) 
KcalSweets 97.72* 95.54 109.67 38.32 85.69 
(131.72) (153.33) (156.08) (87.47) (136.69) 
KcalDrinks 86.45*** 47.89 41.92 37.00 53.63 
(54.25) (71.37) (55.35) (62.74) (63.78) 
Fats 14.80*** 9.080** 11.23* 6.431 10.440 
(11.39) (9.449) (9.834) (10.353) (10.646) 
SatFats 3.932*** 2.912** 3.401*** 2.016 3.078 
(4.517) (3.448) (3.493) (4.206) (3.970) 
Sugars 31.52*** 23.60* 22.39 14.40 23.09 
(17.02) (25.91) (22.79) (19.48) (22.19) 
Salt 0.843** 0.654 0.754 0.595 0.713 
(0.934) (0.754) (0.809) (0.954) (0.864) 
Hunger 48.17 62.05 52.77 49.39 52.97 
(39.40) (35.27) (35.25) (33.11) (35.94) 
LastEat 185.65 208.24 174.05 190.39 189.53 
(181.38) (276.42) (211.69) (224.74) (223.75) 
Observations 40 39 39 38 156 
Standard deviations in parentheses 
Results of two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test between the treatment group 
and group C:  
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
Table 6: Two-Part Model: Probit estimates for Prob(KcalIn>0)  
Likelihood to consume food or drink items at lunch after the task 
Dependent variable: 1:(KcalIn>0); 0:(KcalIn=0). 
Probability to have lunch 
m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 m7 
TreatH 0.727** 0.693** 0.768** 0.792** 0.792** 0.788** 0.747**
(0.345) (0.349) (0.358) (0.364) (0.377) (0.363) (0.368)
TreatL 0.465 0.548 0.473 0.458 0.458 0.497 0.360
(0.325) (0.342) (0.351) (0.356) (0.372) (0.362) (0.365)
TreatE 0.181 0.157 0.155 0.270 0.270 0.279 0.271
(0.309) (0.311) (0.318) (0.330) (0.331) (0.331) (0.341)
Female -0.447 -0.340 -0.469 -0.469 -0.505* -0.463
(0.273) (0.282) (0.298) (0.298) (0.304) (0.300)
Hunger 0.00956** 0.0116*** 0.0116*** 0.0117*** 0.0106**
(0.00377) (0.00412) (0.00412) (0.00411) (0.00419)
LastEat -0.000297 -0.000297 -0.000303 -0.000256
(0.00058) (0.00058) (0.00058) (0.00059)
Steps -
0.0000100 
(0.00750) 
DiffEnergy -0.0405 
(0.0625) 
DiffHR 0.00340
(0.00514)
Constant 0.555*** 0.885*** 0.359 0.414 0.415 0.436 0.276
(0.215) (0.299) (0.362) (0.377) (0.775) (0.380) (0.446)
Observations 156 154 154 152 152 152 146
Pseudo R2 0.0352 0.0579 0.104 0.124 0.124 0.127 0.116
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
Table 7: Two-Part Model: Probit estimates for Prob(KcalIn>0) (Continued) 
Likelihood to consume food or drink items at lunch after the task 
Dependent variable: 1:(KcalIn>0); 0:(KcalIn=0). 
Probability to have lunch 
m8 m9 m10 m11 
TreatH 0.788** 0.659* 0.374 0.451 
(0.363) (0.388) (0.400) (0.427) 
TreatL 0.497 0.236 0.475 0.282 
(0.362) (0.424) (0.380) (0.435) 
TreatE 0.279 0.258 0.0560 0.120 
(0.331) (0.364) (0.347) (0.382) 
Female -0.505* -0.286 -0.403 -0.241 
(0.304) (0.341) (0.312) (0.346) 
Hunger 0.0117*** 0.0146*** 0.0114*** 0.0140*** 
(0.00411) (0.00466) (0.00422) (0.00470) 
LastEat -0.000303 -0.000595 -0.000355 -0.000612 
(0.000583
) 
(0.000709
) 
(0.000586
) 
(0.000703
) 
DiffEnergy -0.0405 -0.0612 -0.0338 -0.0523 
(0.0625) (0.0713) (0.0658) (0.0724) 
EstKcalOut 0.0134** 0.0118** 
(0.00520) (0.00525) 
ImSatisf 0.199** 0.105 
(0.0795) (0.0899) 
Constant 0.436 -0.292 -0.864 -0.896 
(0.380) (0.459) (0.645) (0.695) 
Observations 152 143 152 143 
Pseudo R2 0.127 0.228 0.172 0.238 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
Table 8: Two-Part Model: OLS Estimates for E(LnExcessKcal| ExcessKcal>0) 
Balance between calories consumed and burned 
Dependent variable: LnExcessKcal 
Log of excess calories 
m12 m13 m14 m14 m16 
TreatH 0.599** 0.568** 0.596** 0.568** 0.593** 
(0.257) (0.259) (0.254) (0.260) (0.255) 
TreatL 0.305 0.281 0.244 0.246 0.220 
(0.261) (0.265) (0.272) (0.265) (0.271) 
TreatE 0.625** 0.625** 0.614** 0.625** 0.614** 
(0.246) (0.245) (0.249) (0.246) (0.251) 
Female -0.365** -0.313* -0.373** -0.331** 
(0.164) (0.172) (0.158) (0.165) 
Hunger 0.00399 0.00388 
(0.00247) (0.00267) 
LastEat 0.0000608 -0.000062 
(0.000491
) 
(0.000489
) 
Constant 5.266*** 5.509*** 5.254*** 5.503*** 5.284*** 
(0.207) (0.242) (0.277) (0.253) (0.271) 
Observations 126 125 125 124 124 
R2 0.0695 0.105 0.127 0.110 0.130 
Adjusted R2 0.0467 0.0751 0.0903 0.0720 0.0849 
Heteroskedatisc-robust standard errors 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
Table 9: Two-Part Model: OLS Estimates for E(LnExcessKcal| ExcessKcal>0) 
(Continued) 
Balance between calories consumed and burned 
Dependent variable: LnExcessKcal 
Log of excess calories 
m17 m18 m19 m20 m21 m22 m23 
TreatH 0.596** 0.635** 0.636** 0.613** 0.661** 0.650** 0.634**
(0.254) (0.265) (0.256) (0.253) (0.266) (0.255) (0.264) 
TreatL 0.244 0.295 0.305 0.296 0.337 0.357 0.326 
(0.272) (0.299) (0.278) (0.287) (0.300) (0.291) (0.308) 
TreatE 0.614** 0.620** 0.650** 0.642** 0.651** 0.678** 0.638**
(0.249) (0.254) (0.255) (0.263) (0.257) (0.265) (0.263) 
Female -0.313* -0.323* -0.346** -0.312* -0.350** -0.349** -0.321* 
(0.172) (0.171) (0.168) (0.178) (0.169) (0.174) (0.177) 
Hunger 0.00399 0.00401 0.00428* 0.00405 0.00426* 0.00434 0.00398
(0.00247) (0.00249) (0.00247) (0.00267) (0.00248) (0.00265) (0.00272)
Steps -0.00293 -0.00225 -0.00254
(0.00510) (0.00519) (0.00600)
DiffEnergy -0.0374 -0.0333 -0.0386 
(0.0439) (0.0453) (0.0453) 
DiffHR -0.00111 -0.000881 -0.000322
(0.00346) (0.00346) (0.00403)
Constant 5.254*** 5.521*** 5.235*** 5.308*** 5.442*** 5.278*** 5.503***
(0.277) (0.489) (0.277) (0.312) (0.510) (0.317) (0.514) 
Observations 125 125 125 120 125 120 120 
R2 0.127 0.130 0.132 0.123 0.134 0.128 0.125 
Adjusted R2 0.0903 0.0856 0.0881 0.0763 0.0821 0.0740 0.0698 
Heteroskedatisc-robust standard errors 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
Table 10: Two-Part Model: OLS Estimates for E(LnExcessKcal| ExcessKcal>0) 
(Continued) 
Balance between calories consumed and burned 
Dependent variable: LnExcessKcal 
Log of excess calories 
m24 m25 m26 m27 m28 m29 
TreatH 0.596** 0.582** 0.335 -2.010 -1.444 
(0.254) (0.259) (0.294) (1.325) (1.392) 
TreatL 0.244 0.370 0.128 0.254 0.822 
(0.272) (0.276) (0.280) (0.567) (0.684) 
TreatE 0.614** 0.604** 0.468* -1.646** -1.076 
(0.249) (0.253) (0.261) (0.801) (0.887) 
Female -0.313* -0.299* -0.254 -0.237 -0.241 -0.249 
(0.172) (0.180) (0.171) (0.171) (0.172) (0.170) 
Hunger 0.00399 0.00256 0.00416 0.00443* 0.00434* 0.00434* 
(0.00247) (0.00250) (0.00251) (0.00249) (0.00250) (0.00249) 
EstKcalOut 0.000245 
(0.000418
) 
ImSatisf 0.149** 0.0853 0.114* 
(0.0587) (0.0781) (0.0677) 
SatH 0.311** 0.225 0.0513 
(0.147) (0.167) (0.0380) 
SatL -0.00112 -0.0867 0.0169 
(0.0752) (0.107) (0.0405) 
SatE 0.297*** 0.211* 0.0713** 
(0.0966) (0.123) (0.0359) 
Constant 5.254*** 5.306*** 4.215*** 5.179*** 4.621*** 4.426*** 
(0.277) (0.289) (0.479) (0.277) (0.509) (0.476) 
Observations 125 118 125 125 125 125 
R2 0.127 0.112 0.176 0.211 0.216 0.188 
Adjusted R2 0.0903 0.0642 0.135 0.157 0.155 0.147 
Heteroskedatisc-robust standard errors 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
Table 11: Main nutritional intakes in each food and drink item 
Nutritional intakes 
Kcal Fats Saturated Fats Sugars Salt 
Bacon, lettuce, and tomato 396 14.3 4.1 7.1 1.5 
Chicken and bacon 470 16 3 5 1.68 
Ham and cheese 459 18.7 7.8 6.2 1.78 
Tuna and sweet corn 298 6.7 0.7 4.2 1.09 
Roast chicken salad (low fat) 281 3.7 0.5 2.6 0.9 
Bacon and chicken (low fat) 364 5.6 2 2.9 1.61 
Tuna and cucumber (low fat) 290 4.6 0.7 3.4 1.3 
Cheese and tomato 401 19.6 12.7 3.9 1.74 
Cheese and celery 380 18.9 9.8 3.7 1.36 
Crisps 132 8.1 0.5 0.3 0.19 
Muffin 293 13.9 2.5 20.4 0.29 
Chocolate bar 247 12.5 6.2 25.5 0 
Apple 47 0.1 0 11.8 0 
Orange juice  94 0.2 0 20.0 0 
Coke 139 0 0 35 0 
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